



Director of
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
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Beirut and Vicinity Military Update



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LEBANON: Pressure Increases on Gemayel

A successful joint attack by opposition forces against Army positions on the southern Alayh ridgeline yesterday probably will force President Gemayel either to come to terms with Syria or resign.

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indicate that a Druze and Palestinian attack that began on Monday dislodged elements of the Army's 4th Brigade from positions near Qabr Shmun on the Alayh ridgeline. Despite airstrikes and attempts at reinforcement, the brigade has evacuated its positions near Khaldah and retreated south to Ad Damur. To try to intimidate the Druze, the Israelis sent an armored column north of the Awwali River along the coastal road to Ad Damur.

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Phalange hardliners and Christian Army officers are concerned that the Army's increasingly desperate situation will prompt Gemayel to reach an accommodation with Syria. Christian extremists, who reportedly already believe that both Gemayel and Army commander Tannous should step down, will violently oppose such a move.

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Comment: The withdrawal of the 4th Brigade from Qabr Shmun opens the way for unimpeded reinforcement and resupply of Druze, Palestinian, and Shia fighters in south and West Beirut.

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Israeli units frequently patrol north of the Awwali River to remind the Druze and Christians in the Shuf of their ability to intervene militarily if either side violates the cease-fire there. They are unlikely to intervene in fighting between the Army and its opponents, however, unless the government accepts Tel Aviv's demands for implementation of the 17 May accord.

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With the effective loss of the 4th Brigade, only the 8th Brigade is left on the Alayh ridgeline. If Gemayel withdraws this unit to prevent it from being outflanked, the entire ridgeline would be lost to the Druze.

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If the President leaves the 8th Brigade in place, however, he risks losing it to an attack by the Druze and the Palestinians. The Christian community is likely to urge that the brigade be saved for the defense of the Christian heartland north of Beirut.

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
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
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
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Gemayel is in an increasingly untenable position. Opposition victories yesterday will further undermine morale among Army troops and the government's remaining credibility. The Army and the Christian Lebanese Forces militia now control only East Beirut and the Christian heartland. 

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
Under these circumstances, Gemayel has few alternatives. He may yield to demands for his resignation, or seek an accommodation with Syria and his Syrian-backed Druze and Muslim opponents. He probably still hopes, however, that US military action will save his government. 

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If Christian hardliners seeking to prevent an accommodation with Syria try to assassinate or overthrow Gemayel, they almost certainly would unleash all-out civil war. 

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USSR: Possible Leadership Alignments

Older members of the Politburo have played the predominant roles in all the public ceremonies held since Andropov died. []

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Chernenko, Premier Tikhonov, Defense Minister Ustinov, and Foreign Minister Gromyko stood at the forefront of the leadership during the lying-in-state and honor guard ceremonies on Saturday. At the Central Committee plenum on Monday, Tikhonov nominated Chernenko for the post of general secretary. According to all Soviet media releases to date, they were the only speakers. []

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At Andropov's funeral yesterday, Chernenko, Ustinov, and Gromyko delivered eulogies. These three, plus Tikhonov, also were the only Politburo members to hold discussions yesterday with visiting party and government leaders of Warsaw Pact countries. []

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A Western news service states that some Soviet officials are saying privately that the delay in announcing the selection of Chernenko as general secretary was the result of resistance on the part of younger members of the Politburo to his succession. []

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Comment: In 1982 the selection of Chernenko to nominate Andropov apparently was intended as a show of unity between loser and winner. This time, however, no losing group is represented. Chernenko and Tikhonov have been allies since the Brezhnev era. []

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Many Soviet officials privately acknowledged that Ustinov was a primary source of Andropov's support in the Politburo and that Ustinov and Gromyko backed Andropov against Chernenko in 1982. As a result, the delivery of eulogies by all three suggests a demonstration of solidarity that was missing at the plenum. []

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At least two of the younger members of the leadership, party secretaries Gorbachev and Romanov, probably should have played a more prominent role in the ceremonies. They and other young leaders may be temporarily eclipsed as a result of having opposed Chernenko and lost—especially if Ustinov and Gromyko backed Chernenko. []

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The reported unhappiness of younger leadership figures over the perpetuation of "old guard" rule probably stems in part from career concerns. More broadly, however, they may fear that the "seniors" are no longer capable of ruling effectively in the face of the USSR's manifold problems. []

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
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Status of South African Presence in Angola



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SOUTH AFRICA-ANGOLA: Status of Disengagement

The military disengagement in southern Angola apparently continues without serious incident. [redacted]

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[redacted] South Africa is continuing to withdraw its conventional forces from the area but that it retains a military presence at Ngiva, Xangongo, Mupa, Embundu, and Calueque. Although a senior South African official told the US Embassy last week that conventional forces would be out of Angola by today, he said that reconnaissance forces would remain at Techamutete and some other points until a cease-fire monitoring agreement is reached. [redacted]

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South Africa recently has protested offensive activity by SWAPO,

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Last week SWAPO leader Nujoma told a US official that his organization would cooperate with a cease-fire, but he insisted he did not control guerrilla forces in the field. Nujoma said he distrusted the Angolans and resented being excluded from the impending talks.

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Comment: Both Pretoria and Luanda are eager to give a cease-fire a chance, and they appear to be adhering to the terms of the disengagement. SWAPO, which appears to be the most reluctant party, is concerned that it may be the casualty of Angolan-South African negotiations and may try to play an obstructionist role. [redacted]

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Pretoria so far seems willing to tolerate minor infractions by SWAPO. A major clash in southern Angola or a bloody terrorist incident in Namibia, however, could provoke a South African military response and set back broader negotiations. [redacted]

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
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SSC-3 Antiship Cruise Missile Deployment



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USSR-SYRIA: New Coastal Defense System

The USSR has for the first time delivered to Syria the SSC-3 antiship cruise missile system [redacted]

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[redacted] The SSC-3 system uses a shore-based development of the SS-N-2 Styx missile carried on Syrian missile patrol boats and is highly mobile. It has a range of approximately 90 kilometers.

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Comment: When the system is deployed, the missiles will pose a threat to ships operating near the Syrian coast. The Syrians probably will need only a short training period on the SSC-3 because they already have some experience with the Styx missile. [redacted]

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EASTERN EUROPE-USSR: Reaction to Chernenko's Succession

The East Europeans are reacting cautiously to the accession of Konstantin Chernenko as Soviet party leader. Congratulatory messages from the East European leaders closely resemble those sent to Andropov when he succeeded Brezhnev 15 months ago. Official reaction to Andropov's death has been restrained. Romania's was almost perfunctory. [redacted]

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Comment: Most East European leaders probably hope the succession will help clarify the lines of Soviet authority, and they will be anxious to see how Chernenko puts his stamp on policy. The Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians were uncomfortable with Andropov, the Romanians had serious differences with him, and all three almost certainly anticipate an improvement in relations with the Soviets. The Hungarians, who lost a sympathetic friend in Andropov, will try to reestablish support in Moscow for their innovative policies. All East European leaders presumably hope that a new Soviet leadership will allow an easing of East-West tensions and greater leeway to pursue their own interests. [redacted]

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PAKISTAN: Student Unrest in Karachi

University students in Karachi are demonstrating against the ban on student unions declared last week. The US Consulate General reports that police so far have contained the protests, but university officials fear the opposition will grow. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] fundamentalist students, who generally support President Zia's government, feel betrayed by the ban. Although the president of Pakistan's strongest religious party has urged Zia to rescind the order, he also has called on the students to remain peaceful. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Student activists previously spent most of their energies on squabbling among themselves, but the ban could unite them. As a result of the failure last year of the opposition's campaign of agitation, however, Zia may judge that student radicals lack support to contest the government on this issue. The President is likely to win his gamble, if the protests remain confined to Karachi. If they spread to Punjab Province, however, he might lose substantial conservative support. [REDACTED]

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WEST GERMANY-EAST GERMANY: Leaders Meet in Moscow

Chancellor Kohl and East German party leader Honecker publicly expressed satisfaction with the results of their meeting on Monday in Moscow. This is the first time that the two have met. Their session of nearly two hours—twice the scheduled length—dealt primarily with the general international situation and with the development of intra-German relations, according to press statements issued by both sides. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The hasty arrangement of the summit on the eve of Andropov's funeral reflects the continued, mutual desire to improve relations. Kohl hopes to isolate intra-German ties from general East-West tensions, partly because furthering relations remains one of his most popular policies, while East Germany remains especially interested in making favorable economic deals with Bonn. Honecker apparently calculates that Moscow's current policy toward Western Europe allows him some latitude in dealing with the West Germans. The two leaders probably did not reach any specific agreements, but the discussion could encourage some movement in bilateral talks. [REDACTED]

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HONDURAS-EL SALVADOR: Bilateral Talks

Recent talks between senior Honduran and Salvadoran officials in Tegucigalpa represent a limited improvement in relations. [redacted]

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[redacted] both sides candidly discussed nationalistic concerns that have hampered negotiations on their territorial dispute. The Salvadorans reportedly agreed to consider a Honduran suggestion to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice earlier than the date of late 1985 stipulated by a bilateral treaty. On regional issues, the officials concluded that closer unity in the Contadora negotiations is essential and that political and military pressure has to be maintained on Nicaragua. [redacted]

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Comment: The often-postponed meeting followed several weeks of heated rhetoric and mutual misunderstandings. The Hondurans and Salvadorans now plan to continue discussing their differences at the ministerial level, where some compromises could be reached. Moreover, their agreement on mutual regional goals improves the atmosphere for future bilateral cooperation. [redacted]

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CHINA-EGYPT: New Naval Deliveries

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[redacted]
[redacted]. Since early 1982, Beijing has delivered four diesel submarines, five subchasers, and four Shanghai-class patrol boats under a \$750 million contract that calls for additional deliveries, including two frigates. Egypt currently is China's only customer for warships larger than coastal patrol craft. The US military attache in Egypt says Cairo plans to improve the serviceable but outdated Chinese naval craft with Western electronics and weapons.

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Comment: The Egyptians are anxious to replace their aging Soviet-built fleet, but they are severely in debt. The Chinese provide an attractive solution by offering generous repayment plans and compatible military hardware at low prices. Beijing probably anticipates that exports to Egypt will lead to more naval sales to other Third World countries. [redacted]

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Special Analysis

USSR: Implications of the Succession

In choosing 72-year-old Konstantin Chernenko as Andropov's successor, the leadership appears to have voted for the political status quo, as opposed to the uncertainty that selection of a younger leader might have created. This holding action, however, could stimulate resentment among middle-level officials in the party and lead to discord in its higher ranks. As a result, more overt politicking is likely to develop over time within the leadership.

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The current political circumstances are considerably different from those that existed when Chernenko lost his bid for the top party job after Brezhnev died. Andropov's death left Chernenko as the only member of the Politburo's "old guard" who was institutionally in a good position to claim the post.

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Defense Minister Ustinov, the only other senior leader who realistically might have been chosen, may not have wanted the job, or he may have been considered too important in his current position to move. Ustinov also may have preferred to play the role of power broker, rather than to seek the job.

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Ustinov and Foreign Minister Gromyko, who reputedly were unwilling to support Chernenko when Brezhnev died, may have found him less threatening to their political careers than the younger alternatives in the Secretariat—Mikhail Gorbachev and Grigoriy Romanov. The senior members of the Politburo probably considered Gorbachev, at 52, too young for the job. The more experienced 61-year-old Romanov moved from Leningrad to his post in Moscow less than a year ago, and he may not have had enough time to build the required power base in the capital.

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There have been signs that the decision to select Chernenko was a difficult one. For example, the Central Committee plenum that ratified the Politburo's selection was not held until Monday. Some Soviet sources say the delay was caused by a rearguard action by younger members of the Politburo opposed to Chernenko's selection.

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The fact that Premier Tikhonov, Chernenko's strongest ally, made the speech nominating the new General Secretary, rather than one of the younger Politburo members or one of the seniors associated with Andropov's accession, also indicates that all was not smoothed over. In 1982, Chernenko, in an obvious effort to portray a united leadership, made the speech nominating Andropov.

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Possible Political Costs

If the selection was as contentious as these signals suggest, Chernenko's victory may have been won at the cost of some power-sharing arrangement. Ustinov and Gromyko, for example, may have gained an even stronger voice in national security issues than they had under Andropov. In this area, Chernenko has less experience than either Brezhnev or Andropov had. []

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Under these circumstances, the state presidency could go either to one of the younger leaders who was passed over for the top party job or to a senior member of the group opposing Chernenko. Some agreement also may have been reached on the premiership, which could be vacated soon by the 78-year-old Tikhonov. Chernenko's elevation, however, may give Tikhonov incentive to stay on. []

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Regardless of whether such arrangements were made, Chernenko's narrow background and his lack of a strong political base argue for a decrease in the General Secretary's authority. It also may portend an increase in looser decisionmaking, with perhaps more participants involved in the process. []

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Unlike Andropov, Chernenko appears to have more support among the regionally based leaders than among the Politburo members based in Moscow. This increased emphasis on "collectivity" and Chernenko's apparent political dependence on Politburo members assigned outside the capital could cause the leadership to be slower to respond to sensitive US proposals. []

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Direction of Foreign Policy

While Brezhnev was in power, Chernenko emphasized many of his patron's favorite themes, including the importance of "detente" and the need to expand East-West trade. Shortly before Brezhnev died, Chernenko endorsed the "normalization and improvement" of relations with the US. []

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Under Andropov, Chernenko echoed criticism of US policies but refrained from stressing the importance of military readiness or ruling out the possibility of improved Soviet-US ties. Now that Chernenko is General Secretary, however, he probably will tailor his public foreign policy references to the demands of a broader constituency. []

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In Chernenko's first speech as General Secretary, he made an obligatory bow to the importance of strengthening the country's defense capacity, although he also took a moderate line toward the US. His latitude in this area is likely to be limited as long as Gromyko and Ustinov remain firmly entrenched. []

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Economic Priorities

On the domestic front, Chernenko is most associated with efforts to promote a more open style of leadership—as reflected in the decision to publicize Politburo agendas—and greater responsiveness to citizens' complaints. In the past, Chernenko has called for increasing the availability of consumer goods, and he is likely to devote more attention than Andropov did to this program. [REDACTED]

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Nonetheless, there are no indications that Chernenko has the influence or the inclination to push for any major shifts in resources. In his first speech he indicated that he will continue to pursue Andropov's goal of "improving the economic mechanism." Chernenko is likely to be less willing than Andropov, however, to take on the economic bureaucracy overseen by Tikhonov. [REDACTED]

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Reassuring Notes

Unlike Andropov, Chernenko probably will be more sensitive to job security and fill more vacancies through promotions within the institutions. [REDACTED]

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Chernenko's concern with building his political base also is likely to mean that he will make a sharper distinction than Andropov did between the discipline campaign, which appears to have broad support, and the campaign against corruption, which party and government officials probably find threatening. He appeared to be assuring his audience that no purge was imminent when, in his initial speech, he noted that "competent, experienced, knowledgeable people" had been elected to leading posts. [REDACTED]

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The General Secretary also gave a nod in his speech to the important role played by regional party leaders—the group that is said to be the core of his support and which he is likely to cultivate in the future. During his funeral oration, he pointedly referred to the Central Committee—where regional leaders represent the largest bloc—rather than the Politburo, as the source of authority for party decisions. [REDACTED]

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Jamaica: Chronology of Events

Early November	Events in Grenada give Seaga a lead in the polls.
23 November	Seaga announces failure to meet IMF targets and devalues the dollar.
25 November	Seaga calls for general election.
28 November	Opposition announces a boycott, charging Seaga violated his promise not to hold new general elections without updated voter lists.
29 November	Nominations close; opposition boycott holds in all 60 constituencies.
Early December	Polls show 70 percent want new elections based on updated lists and indicate a 55-percent margin for Manley in such an election.
15 December	Country's first one-party parliament elected.
30 December	More austerity measures and increases in gasoline and electricity prices announced.
15 January	Rise in antigovernment sentiment reflected in last-minute surge in voter registration.

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Special Analysis

JAMAICA: Seaga's Prospects

Prime Minister Seaga is in Washington this week seeking a softening of terms from the IMF and more US assistance. His hope of serving out the full five-year term that he won in the early election he called two months ago is fading rapidly. Growing political tension and deteriorating economic conditions have increased Seaga's vulnerability to opposition attacks and weakened his ability to control the tempo and direction of events. Seaga could face overwhelming pressure to call a new general election as soon as electoral reforms are implemented in May or June—a contest his party would have difficulty winning.

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The rise in Seaga's popularity immediately following the intervention in Grenada has been eroded by popular dissatisfaction with the uncontested election in December and the country's growing financial problems. The private sector's support for Seaga's austerity program is faltering as a result of high interest rates and stringent credit and the government's continuing difficulty in reaching an agreement with the IMF for a standby loan. Meanwhile, labor unions are calling for higher wages to counter steep price rises resulting from the 56-percent devaluation of the Jamaican dollar last year.

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Investor and voter confidence probably will continue to deteriorate. The IMF's demands—including a free-floating exchange rate and substantial budget cuts—would increase prices, further reduce key imports, and raise unemployment. The country's foreign financial bind has become so severe that Kingston reportedly is considering a moratorium on servicing its debt to private lenders and an appeal to the Paris Club for rescheduling of its officially held debt.

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Seaga's Strategy

Continued economic troubles could result in the ruling party losing local elections that are legally required to be held by June. US Embassy sources say Seaga may try to postpone these elections until fall, when he expects a rise in bauxite production and new investment in tourism that he hopes will shore up his popularity. The Embassy reports that Seaga met with IMF officials in Washington this week to request that IMF-stipulated budget cuts be phased in after the local election in order to maintain employment on several rural projects.

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Seaga will try to persuade Jamaicans that there is a better chance for economic recovery under his leadership than under opposition leader Manley. If he does not, he could be faced with the choice of risking political defeat by acceding to demands for a general election, or jeopardizing any hope of a quick economic recovery by resorting to repressive measures to maintain order. [REDACTED]

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Manley's Strategy

[REDACTED]

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Manley also has given priority to repairing the party's reputation, which has been tarnished by past anti-US rhetoric and by a close association with Havana and Moscow. He is emphasizing more moderate positions and underscoring his support for foreign investment and the US-sponsored Caribbean Basin Initiative. The party's leftwing faction has been pushed into the background. [REDACTED]

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Outlook

Seaga's political fortunes are linked to the economy's uncertain prospects. The anticipated recovery in bauxite and tourism earnings is predicated on a steady improvement in the world economy, and it could be undercut by recently proposed taxes on these industries. The potential for labor unrest will grow as inflationary pressures intensify. [REDACTED]

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Calls for a new general election are likely to become more strident, and they will not be calmed by holding elections for local offices. [REDACTED]

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